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over, they must obtain a search warrant before examining the
suitcase's contents. 4 ' 9 This precedent can be similarly reconciled
in the New York Supreme Court case of People v. Hayes. ° In
Hayes, the police had the authority to remove clothing of a
defendant from a hospital. However, the police exceeded their
boundaries when they performed tests of the blood found on the
defendant's clothing.41

SUPREME COURT
QUEENS COUNTY
People v. Brewer412
(decided June 10, 1997)
Three men were charged with criminal weapons possession
413
after the arresting officers stopped their vehicle in traffic.
They moved to suppress physical evidence obtained by the police,
and statements made to police. 4" Defendants argued that the
evidence was obtained in violation of their rights against unlawful
search and seizure, guaranteed by the United States
Constitution41 5 and the New York State Constitution.1 6 The
motion to suppress was denied because the search of the
409 See

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1971).

410154

Misc. 2d 429, 584 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (Sup. Ct. New York County

1992).
4 11

Id.

412id

173 Misc. 2d 520, 622 N.Y.S.2d 172 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1997).
413 Id. at 521, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
414 Id.
415 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The amendment protects the right "of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures ...but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation .... " Id.
416 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12, cl. 1. This provision mirrors the Fourth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution verbatim.
412
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defendants' vehicle was found to be reasonable notwithstanding
the motives of the arresting officers, and therefore not barred by
either constitution as unreasonable search and seizure.41 7
Police Officer Hill was driving with his sergean 18 and was
stopped at a traffic light.4 9 As he waited, he observed another
car make a right turn through the intersection with no headlights
on.4'0 After this vehicle made the turn, it pulled over to the side
of the road, pulled out again quickly, then turned back to the side
of the road for a second time a few seconds later. 42' At this time,
Hill stopped the car on the next block.4
When the car stopped, the driver, defendant Eaddy got out and
walked toward Hill's car, behaving suspiciously. 423 Officer Hill
requested to see his license, but Eaddy said that he did not have it
with him.424 He further explained that he did not want the rear
passengers, Henry and Brewer, in the car. 425 Hill then told
Brewer to exit the vehicle, but when he did, Hill noticed a bulge
around his waistband.42
After a brief scuffle, Hill obtained the object, which turned out
to be a flashlight. 427 Hill then saw codefendant, Ashraf, still in
417 Brewer,

173 Misc. 2d at 528, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 176.

418 Id. at 522, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 172. They drove in an unmarked police car.

Id.

'19 Id. at 522, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
42

0 Id.

Hill testified that he saw a passenger in the rear of the vehicle look at

him as the car passed through the intersection, and then its lights were turned
on. Id.
421 Id.
4

n Id.
423 Id. at 522, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 172-73. Eaddy walked toward Officer Hill

"with his hand in a 'semi-raised' position." Id. at 522, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
The officer told him to go back to the vehicle twice, and Eaddy did so, but
only halfway into the driver's seat. Id.
424 Id. at 522, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 173. Eaddy said he did not have his own
license available, but he was borrowing his sister's car to give Hopkins, one of
the passengers, a ride. Id.
425 Id.
42

6 Id.
427 id.
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the car, pulling a gun from his waistband. 4' Ashraf dropped his
gun to the floor of the car, and codefendant Henry kicked his feet
under the driver's seat.429 Hill removed Henry from the vehicle,
and began to search the car.430 Underneath the driver's seat, the
officer recovered a loaded 9-millimeter pistol, and the .44 caliber
revolver Ashraf had dropped.431

The defendants moved to suppress the physical evidence and
statements made after they were charged with illegal weapons
possession.432 At the suppression hearing, Officer Hill testified
that he did not stop the vehicle immediately after he had observed
two Vehicle and Traffic Law violations, and that he did not issue
summonses, but merely followed defendants, thereby continuing
his surveillance of the car. 433 The court held that this infraction
was clearly a pretext to further investigation of suspected criminal
activity."'
To determine the validity of the stop, the Brewer court relied
on New York case law. 435 The Court of Appeals has held that in
New York State, traffic stops are seizures "implicating
constitutional limitations," 436 and therefore they are only legal
when they are done as either routine, nonpretextual checks to
42

8 Id.

In response, Hill drew his own revolver. Id.

Id. at 523, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
430 Id.
429

Id. The officer also recovered a ski mask from each defendant, except
Eaddy. Id.
431

432

Id.

433

Id.
Id.
435 People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 330 N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67
(1975). "In the context of a motor vehicle 'stop,' the degree of suspicion
required to justify the stop is minimal." Id. at 415, 330 N.E.2d at 40, 369
N.Y.S.2d at 69. "All that is required is that the stop not be the product of
mere whim, caprice, or ... curiosity." Id. at 420, 330 N.E.2d at 44, 369
N.Y.S.2d at 74.
436 People v. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d 749, 752, 646 N.E.2d 785, 787,
622
N.Y.S.2d 483, 485 (1995) (holding that traffic stops are seizures "within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment," regardless of their purpose or duration of
each search).
434
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enforce regulations, or as preventive action to investigate a
reasonable suspicion that the driver and/or passengers have
performed an illegal act.437

This position was followed by the Second Department in People
v. Roundtree43 8 and People v. David 39 holding that traffic

violations cannot be used as a pretext to search a suspect's vehicle
or interrogate him for unrelated crimes." 0 Several other New
York cases similarly held that police officers could not search a
motor vehicle after they had only stopped it for a vehicle and
traffic violation."
437

Id. at 753, 646 N.E.2d at 787-88, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 485-86.

438 234 A.D.2d 612, 651 N.Y.S.2d 615 (2d Dep't 1996), appeal denied, 89

N.Y.2d 1040, 681 N.E.2d 1318, 659 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1997). In Roundiree,
policemen followed a vehicle for six blocks because it resembled the make and
model of a car used in transporting illegal firearms. Id. at 613, 651 N.Y.S.2d
at 615. The officer stopped the vehicle when the driver allegedly made a left
turn without signaling, but never questioned the motorist about the traffic
violation. Id. The officer stated that he wanted to investigate gun-running in
the area. Id.
439 223 A.D.2d 551, 553, 636 N.Y.S.2d 374, 376-77 (2d Dep't 1996). In
David, a police officer stopped a car because the driver was not wearing his
seat belt, and the inspection sticker had expired. Id. at 551, 636 N.Y.S.2d at
376. After the stop, the officer found that the driver had several falsified
licenses, "sap" gloves (used as weapons), and hidden drugs. Id. at 551-52,
636 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
44 Roundtree, 234 A.D.2d at 612-13, 651 N.Y.S.2d at 615.
"Although
police observation of a traffic infraction is a sufficient basis to satisfy a stop of
the offending vehicle ....
it is equally well settled that the 'police may not use
a traffic violation as a mere pretext to investigate a suspect on an unrelated
matter.'" Id. See also David, 223 A.D.2d at 553, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 376,
441 See People v. Laws, 213 A.D.2d 226, 623 N.Y.S.2d 860 (Ist Dep't
1995). In Lmvs, an out-of-state license plate and a broken taillight on a rental
car raised the officer's suspicions of drug-related activity. Id. at 226-27, 623
N.Y.S.2d at 861. A pistol was recovered from the defendant. Id. The court
upheld the suppression of the weapon as "the fruit of an unjustified stop. Id.
at 227, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 861. See also People v. Smith, 181 A.D.2d 802, 581
N.Y.S.2d 240 (2d Dep't 1992). In Smith, the police saw defendant leave a
known "stash house" with a bag, and get into a cab. Id. at 803, 581
N.Y.S.2d at 241. The officer stopped the cab after it made a sudden U-turn,
the bag was searched, and a gun was found. Id. The suppression of this
evidence was also upheld as the product of a pretextual search. Id. See also
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However, the United States Supreme Court in Whren v. United
States,"2 held that pretextual searches were not prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment. 443 As in the instant case, undercover
policemen in an unmarked car observed another vehicle that
contained suspicious-looking occupants who violated traffic
laws.4 When the police car drove up to the vehicle, the officer
observed several bags of crack-cocaine." 5 The district court
denied the suppression and ruled that the officer's actions were
the same as for any traffic stop. 44 6 Defendants were convicted,
they appealed, and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari." 7
A unanimous Court, per Justice Scalia, held that an officer's
motive does not invalidate objectively justifiable behavior under
the Fourth Amendment, and that subjective intent by itself does
not render otherwise legal conduct unconstitutional." 8 The Court

acknowledged that a traffic stop is a "seizure" within the

People v. Watson, 157 A.D.2d 476, 549 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1st Dep't 1990). In
Watson, the court found that the evidence did not establish probable cause to
believe that the defendants were in the process of committing a crime. Id. at
477, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 27. Since the driver's traffic violations were not the
reason why the police pulled the car over, the court held that they could not
"be used to justify the stop." Id.
442 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
443 Id. at 1774.
4" Id. at 1772. In Whren, the truck had temporary license plates, and the
driver repeatedly looked down into his passenger's lap. Id. The truck sat at
an intersection for "what seemed to be an unusually long time - more than 20
seconds." Id. The driver then made a sharp turn without signaling and sped
off at an "unreasonable speed." Id.
445 Id.

446 Id.
447 Id. The District of Columbia Circuit held that regardless of the officer's
subjective beliefs, "a traffic stop is permissible as long as a reasonable officer
in the same circumstances could have stopped the car for the suspected
violation." Id. (citing United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371 (D.C. Cir.
1995)).
448 Id. at 1774.
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constitutional definition, 449 but the seizure is reasonable when
based on probable cause.4 50
The Brewer court questioned whether Whren had overruled the
earlier New York cases that held against pretextual searches.4 51
Defendants argued that since the Supreme Court had previously
upheld pretextual stops in its earlier cases, New York courts had
already rejected the ruling that permitted pretextual searches.452
However, the Brewer court explained that it could not conclude
that New York had rejected Whren's interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment.453 In fact, Whren was cited favorably by People v.
McCoy,4' a recent case similar to the instant matter.455
Moreover, the Brewer court held that even if Whren were
decided earlier, there was no evidence that New York courts

rejected the Supreme Court's interpretation, since they had not
addressed the issue.4 56 The earlier cases 4 7 did not cite the New

York State Constitution, and only one recent case adopted the
premise that the State Constitution could provide New York

449 Id.at

450 Id. at

1772.

1776.
451 Brewer, 173 Misc. 2d at 524, 622 N.Y.S.2d at
174.
452 Id.People v. Roundtree, 234 A.D.2d 612, 651 N.Y.S.2d 615 (2d Dep't

1996), which held against pretextual searches, was actually decided after the
Whren decision. Id.
13 Id. at 525, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 174. The Row'zdtree court neither
cited
Whren, nor cited to the New York State Constitution. Id.
454 657 N.Y.S.2d 437 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 91 N.Y.2d 835, 690
N.E.2d 498, 667 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1997).
455 Id. In McCoy, a police officer recognized a suspicious vehicle from a
"roll call" he heard before his shift began. Id. at 438. He also observed that
the car had a broken taillight, and the driver was not wearing his seat belt, so
he pulled him over for the traffic violations. Id. He saw guns and ski masks
inside the car. Id. The court held that a traffic stop was valid because of
vehicle infractions, even though the officer believed the driver to be a suspect
who was identified in an unrelated criminal matter. Id. at 438-39.
456 Brewer, 173 Misc. 2d at 525, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 175.
457 See supra notes 437-42 and accompanying text.
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citizens more protection than under the Federal Constitution.458
Therefore, the Brewer court could find no authority to support the
argument that the pretextual stop violated constitutional rights
under the State Constitution.459
The Brewer court also found that the only times New York
cases cited to constitutional law to support their holdings, they
cited either to the United States Constitution, or to the Supreme
Court cases that interpreted it.460 The court also cited to the
recent case of Ohio v. Robinette461 to illustrate that where state

law is not specifically cited as authority, courts cite to federal
law. 462 The Brewer court concluded that New York courts have
not yet solved the Whren dilemma by interpreting the State
Constitution.463
458

People v. Williams, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 5, 1996, 29 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County

Aug. 4, 1996). While acknowledging Whren, the judge cited to People v.
Spencer as affording greater protection to individual liberties under the State
Constitution, and held the pretextual search before him to be inadmissible. Id.
The phrase, "police stops of automobiles in this State are legal only pursuant
to ...nonpretextual traffic stops" was interpreted as a sign of the state

interpreting its own constitution. Id. (emphasis added). See Spencer, 84
N.Y.2d at 753, 646 N.E.2d at 787, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
459 Brewer, 173 Misc. 2d at 526, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 175.
460 Id. The court cited to several cases that were either silent as to
constitutional authority or only cited to the Federal Constitution. Id. See
People v. Owens, 164 Misc. 2d 15, 623 N.Y.S.2d 719 (Sup. Ct. New York
County 1995). See also People v. Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559, 373 N.E.2d
1218, 402 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1978). The court also referred to People v.
Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d 749, 646 N.E.2d 785, 622 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1995), which
followed the Federal Constitution as authority, apparently rejecting the
reasoning of the Bronx Supreme Court in People v. Williams, N.Y. L.J., Aug.
5, 1996, 29.
461 117 S.Ct. 417 (1996). In Robinette, the Court held that when a state
court decision rests on federal law, or a mixture of state and federal law, and
when the court's opinion does not clarify any independent state law grounds
for the decision, the decision will be construed as to cite federal law as the
basis for its decision. Id. at 420. Incidentally, it also followed Whren as
authority that an arresting officer's subjective intentions did not invalidate a
stop or arrest for probable cause. Id. at 420-21.
462 Brewer,
173 Misc. 2d at 526, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 175.
463 Id.
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The court's final question was whether New York, having not
previously done so, should interpret its own Constitution to give
its citizens broader protection than Whren allows. 4 In People v.
Johnson,46 the Court of Appeals held that since Article I, § 12 of
the New York State Constitution conforms with the Fourth

Amendment, the identical language supports a policy of
uniformity between state and federal courts.466
However, in People v. Reynolds,4 the Court of Appeals noted
that principles of federalism allow a state the right to give its
citizens greater insulation from government intrusion than the
Fourth Amendment provides." Thus, the Brewer court held that
New York courts do have the power to interpret the State
Constitution to provide broader protection than Whren provides,
but it is not a power that a lower court judge can utilize.4 69
As justification for its refusal to interpret the State Constitution
as such, the Brewer court cited People v.Keta,470 which held that
such a duty was the "exclusive domain" of the Court of Appeals,
therefore lower courts must defer to its power. 47' The Second
Department held that this was especially true when dealing with a
provision that had an identical counterpart in the Federal
Constitution. 4' In holding itself incapable to construe the State
Constitution to provide broader rights for the defendants, the
464 id.
465 66 N.Y.2d 398, 488 N.E.2d 439, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1985)
466 Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 406, 488 N.E.2d at 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 624.

The Court of Appeals had traditionally fashioned remedies that conformed to
Federal Constitutional interpretation. Id.
467 71 N.Y.2d 552, 523 N.E.2d 291, 528 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1988).
468 Id. at 557, 523 N.E.2d at 293, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 17. Nevertheless, that
power is still exercised cautiously, because the identical language of the two
clauses still supports a policy of uniformity between State and Federal courts.
Id.
469 Brewer, 173 Misc. 2d at 527, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 176 (referring to Whren
v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996)).
470 165 A.D.2d 172, 567 N.Y.S.2d 738 (2d Dep't 1991).
471 Id. at 177-78, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
472 Id. at 178,

567 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
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Brewer court claimed it was constrained to follow the holding of
Whren, and deny the motion to suppress.473
The Brewer court also cited to People v. Scott474 without
discussing the holding of the case. In that case, the Court of
Appeals rejected any rule that would require it to interpret State
Constitutional provisions in "'lockstep' with the Supreme Court's
interpretations of similarly worded provisions of the Federal
Constitution. " 5

In a concurring opinion, then-Judge Kaye asserted that it is
perfectly legitimate for a state court to reject Supreme Court
precedent and establish higher constitutional standards in its own
jurisdiction.476 While the dissent criticized the majority for
rejecting the policy of uniformity,477 the concurrence stated that

dual sovereignty was a strength of our federal system, and that
47

ruling as such does not insult the Supreme Court. 1
Nevertheless, the Brewer court chose to leave the question open
for that higher court to resolve.479
As stated, the language in both the federal and state provisions
are the same.4"' However, the New York State provision can be
construed to prohibit any traffic stops that are not intended for the

473 Brewer, 173 Misc. 2d at 528, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 176 (citing Keta, 165

A.D.2d at 177-78, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 741).
17' 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992), rev'g
Keta
on othergrounds, 165 A.D.2d 172, 567 N.Y.S.2d 738.
471 Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 490, 593 N.E.2d at 1338, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
476 Id. at 504-05, 593 N.E.2d at 1347, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 939 (Kaye, J.,
concurring).
477 Id. at 506-07, 593 N.E.2d at 1348, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 940 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting). The dissent asserted that before interpreting a state provision
differently from its federal counterpart, there must be enough state case law to
define and justify the scope of protection, rather than mere ideological
disagreement. Id. at 510, 593 N.E.2d at 1350, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 942
(Bellacosa, J,dissenting).
479 Id. at 505-06, 593 N.E.2d at 1348, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 940 (Kaye, J.,
concurring).
479 Brewer, 173 Misc. 2d at 528, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
480 See U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. See also N.Y. CONST. art. I § 12.
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" ' As
sole purpose of issuing a summons for a traffic violation.48

clearly demonstrated in Whren,4

the federal provision is likely to

be construed more conservatively, as to disregard a police
officer's subjective intentions for a traffic stop, thereby limiting
the rights that can be provided under the State Constitution. 4

However, the only way to construe the State provision to give
defendants broader rights against illegal search and seizure than
that which is currently allowable under modern interpretation of
the Fourth
Amendment is for the Court of Appeals to hold as
4
4
such. 9

481

People v. Williams, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 5, 1996 at 29 (citing People v.

Spencer,
84 N.Y.2d 749, 646 N.E.2d 785, 622 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1995)).
412
Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
483 Reynolds, 71 N.Y.2d at 557, 523 N.E.2d at 293, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
The dissent in this case went even further, stating that Supreme Court
precedents are not controlling under the State Constitution, and "there are
good reasons why our State rules should be different." Id. at 562, 523 N.E.2d
at 296, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 20-21 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
484 Keta, 168 A.D.2d at 177-78, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 741; Brewer, 173 Misc.
2d at 527-28, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
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